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Abstract
The problem of constructing pseudorandom generators that fool halfspaces has been
studied intensively in recent times. For fooling halfspaces over {±1}n with polynomi-
ally small error, the best construction known requires seed-length O(log2(n)) [MZ13].
Getting the seed-length down to O(log(n)) is a natural challenge in its own right, which
needs to be overcome in order to derandomize RL. In this work we make progress to-
wards this goal by obtaining near-optimal generators for two important special cases:
• We give a near optimal derandomization of the Chernoff bound for independent,
uniformly random bits. Specifically, we show how to generate x ∈ {±1}n using
O˜(log(n/ε)) random bits such that for any unit vector u, u · x matches the sub-
Gaussian tail behaviour predicted by the Chernoff bound up to error ε.
• We construct a generator which fools halfspaces with {0, 1,−1} coefficients with
error ǫ with a seed-length of O˜(log(n/ǫ)). This includes the important special
case of majorities.
In both cases, the best previous results required seed-length of O(log n+log2(1/ǫ)).
Technically, our work combines new Fourier-analytic tools with the iterative di-
mension reduction techniques and the gradually increasing independence paradigm of
previous works [KMN11, CRSW13, GMR+12].
1
1 Introduction
The theory of pseudorandomness has given compelling evidence that very strong pseu-
dorandom generators (PRGs) exist. For example, assuming that there are computational
problems solvable in exponential time that require exponential-sized circuits, Impagliazzo
and Wigderson [IW97] showed that there exist very strong PRGs which allow us to simu-
late every randomized algorithm deterministically with only a polynomial slowdown, and
thus BPP = P. These results, however, are conditional on a circuit complexity assumption
whose proof seems far off. Since PRGs that fool a class of Boolean circuits also imply lower
bounds for that class, we cannot hope to circumvent this assumption. Thus unconditional
generators are only possible for restricted models of computation for which we have strong
lower bounds.
Bounded-space algorithms are a natural computational model for which we know how to
construct strong PRGs unconditionally. Let RL denote the class of randomized algorithms
with O(log n) work space which can access the random bits in a read-once pre-specified
order. Nisan [Nis92] devised a PRG of seed length O(log2(n/ε)) that fools RL. This
generator was used by Nisan himself to show that RL ⊆ SC [Nis94] and by Saks and
Zhou [SZ99] to prove that RL can be simulated in space O(log3/2 n). Constructing PRGs
with the optimal O(log(n/ǫ)) seed length for this class and showing that RL = L is arguably
the outstanding open problem in derandomization (which might not require a breakthrough
in lower bounds). Despite much progress in this area [INW94, NZ96, RR99, Rei08, RTV06,
BRRY14, BV10, KNP11, De11, GMR+12], there are few cases where we can improve on
Nisan’s twenty year old bound of O(log2 n) [Nis92].
Halfspaces are Boolean functions h : {±1}n → {±1} described as h(x) = sgn(〈w, x〉−θ)
for some weight vector w ∈ Rn and threshold θ ∈ R. They are of central importance in
computatonal complexity, learning theory and social choice. Lower bounds for halfspaces
are trivial, whereas the problem of proving lower bounds against depth-2 TC0 or halfspaces
of halfspaces is a frontier open problem in computational complexity. The problem of
constructing explicit PRGs that can fool halfspaces is a natural challenge that has seen a
lot of exciting progress recently [DGJ+09, MZ13, Kan11b, Kan14]. The best known PRG
construction for halfspaces is that of Meka and Zuckerman [MZ13] who gave a PRG with
seed-length O(log n + log2(1/ǫ)), which is O(log2(n)) for polynomially small error. They
also made a connection to space bounded algorithms by showing that PRGs against RL with
inverse polynomial error can be used to fool halfspaces. Thus constructing better PRGs for
halfspaces seems to be a necessary step towards progress for bounded-space algorithms.
Beyond computational complexity, the problem of constructing better PRGs for half-
spaces has ample algorithmic motivation; perhaps the most compelling of which comes
from the ubiquitous applications in computer science of Chernoff-like bounds for weighted
sums of the form
∑
iwixi where the xis are uniformly random bits. There has been a
long line of work on showing sharp tail bounds for pseudorandom sequences starting from
[SSS95]. A PRG for halfspaces with seed-length O(log(n/ε)) would give a space of support
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size poly(n) where Chernoff-like tail bounds hold. This in turn would yield a black-box de-
randomization with only a polynomial slow-down of any algorithm which relies on uniform
randomness only for such tail bounds. PRGs for halfspaces also have other algorithmic
applications to streaming algorithms for duplicate detection [GR09] and efficient revenue
maximization for certain kinds of auctions [GNR14].
1.1 Our results
A PRG is a function G : {±1}r → {±1}n. We refer to r as the seed-length of the generator.
The O˜() notation hides polylogarithmic factors in its argument. We say G is explicit if the
output of G can be computed in time poly(n).
Definition 1. A PRG G : {±1}r → {±1}n fools a class of functions F = {f : {±1}n →
{±1}} with error ε (or ε-fools F) if for every f ∈ F ,∣∣∣∣ Pr
x∈{±1}n
[f(x) = 1]− Pr
y∈{±1}r
[f(G(y)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ε.
Derandomized Chernoff bounds
Chernoff bounds are a basic tool in the analysis of randomized algorithms. A ubiquitous
version that applies to the setting of independent random bits is the following:
Claim 1 (Chernoff bound). There exist constants c1, c2 > 0 such that for every unit vector
w ∈ Rn and t ≥ 1, Prx∈{±1}n [ |〈w, x〉| > t] ≤ c1e−c2t2 .
We obtain a near-optimal derandomization of this result.
Theorem 1. There exists an explicit generator G1 : {±1}r → {±1}n and constants d1, d2
such that for every unit vector w ∈ Rn, t ≥ 1 and ε > 0,
Pr
y∈u{±1}r
[ |〈w,G1(y)〉| > t] ≤ d1e−d2t2 + ε.
The generator has seed-length r = O˜(log(n/ε)).
To contrast this with what was known previously, consider the setting where ε =
1/poly(n). The Chernoff bound asserts that the probability that |〈w, x〉| = Ω(
√
log(n)) is
inverse polynomially small. A PRG for halfspaces with error parameter ε = 1/poly(n) would
also gurarantee such tails, but the best known construction requires seed-length O(log2(n))
[MZ13]. One could also get such tail bounds using limited indpendence [SSS95]; however,
we would need O(log(n))-wise independence, which again requires O(log2(n)) seed-length.
2
Fooling signed majorities
An important sub-class of halfspaces are those whose weight vectors have {0, 1,−1}-valued
entries. This corresponds to selecting a subset of variables, assiging each of them an
orientation and then taking a threshold. We henceforth refer to this class of halfspaces
as signed majorities. Signed majorities arise naturally in voting theory, learning theory
and property testing - see [MOO05, MORS09, RS13, BO10]. Fooling such tests requires
fooling the sum of arbitrary subsets of variables in statistical distance, a problem that
was studied by [GMRZ13] in their work on fooling combinatorial shapes. Fooling sums
in statistical distance includes as a special case modular tests on sums of variables with
unrestricted modulus [LRTV09, MZ09]. PRGs for modular sums are a strong generalization
of the versatile small-bias spaces [NN93] which correspond to fooling modular sums with
modulus two. The best previously known PRGs due to Lovett et al. for such tests require
seed-length O(log2 n) [LRTV09] for large modulii, but their result can also handle sums
with non-binary coefficients. Finally, signed majorities seem to capture several technical
hurdles in designing optimal PRGs for halfspaces.
We construct a PRG which ε-fools signed majorities with a seed-length of O˜(log(n/ε)).
Theorem 2. There exists an explicit generator G2 : {±1}r → {±1}n with seed-length
r = O˜(log(n/ε)) which ε-fools signed majorities .
The best previous result even for signed majorities had a seed-length of O(log n +
log2(1/ε)) [MZ13]. For the important case of polynomially small error, ε = 1/poly(n), our
result gives the first improvement over the O(log2 n) bound implied by directly applying
known PRGs for space-bounded machines [Nis92, INW94].
Independently and concurrently De [De14] gave a PRG for combinatorial shapes intro-
duced by [GMRZ13] with a seed-length of O(log3/2(n/ε)). These objects are more general
than signed majorities but De’s seed-length is worse than ours.
1.2 Other related work
Starting with the work of Diakonikolas et al. [DGJ+09], there has been a lot of work
on constructing PRGs for halfspaces and related classes of intersections of halfspaces and
polynomial threshold functions over the domain {±1}n [DKN10, GOWZ10, HKM12, MZ13,
Kan11b, Kan11a, Kan14]. Rabani and Shpilka [RS10] construct optimal hitting set gen-
erators for halfspaces over {±1}n; hitting set generators are in general weaker than PRGs
however.
Another line of work gives constructions of PRGs for halfspaces for the uniform distribu-
tion over the sphere (spherical caps) or the Gaussian distribution. This case is easier than
constructing PRGs for halfspaces over the hypercube; the latter objects are known to imply
the former with comparable parameters. For spherical caps, Karnin, Rabani and Shpilka
[KRS12] gave a PRG with a seed-length of O(log n + log2(1/ε)). For the Gaussian distri-
bution, [Kan14] gave a PRG which achieves a seed-length of O(log n + log3/2(1/ε)). Very
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recently, Kothari and Meka [KM14] gave a PRG for spherical caps with a seed-length of
O˜(log(n/ε)). At a high level, [KM14] also uses the iterative dimension reduction approach
like in [KMN11, CRSW13, GMR+12]; however, the final construction and its analysis are
significantly different.
1.3 Overview of our constructions
Derandomized Chernoff bounds
Our first attempt at constructing a PRG for the Chernoff bound applies a simple dimension
reduction step iteratively.
1. Starting from a linear function
∑n
i=1 wixi, (pseudo)randomly hash the variables into√
n buckets using a hash function h.
2. Use an ε-biased string x to sum up coefficients within a bucket. This gives a new
linear function
∑√n
j=1 vjyj in
√
n dimensions where vj =
∑
i:h(i)=j wixi.
Repeating this step log log(n) times, we get down to θ ∈ R which is the value we
output. Call this generator G′. It is easy to see that each output bit of G′ is the xor of
log log(n) bits from independent ε-biased strings, where the hash functions are used to
select co-ordinates from each string. This technique of applying pseudorandom dimension
reduction iteratively is similar to [KMN11, CRSW13, GMR+12].
Does this generator give the desired tail behavior? Assume that we start from a unit
vector w ∈ Rn. To get tail bounds, we would like to control the ℓ2 norm, which starts
at 1 but could increase substantially for particular choices of x. The Chernoff bound
says that for truly random x, the ℓ2 norm is unlikely to increase by more than a factor
of c
√
log(n). Even if we manage to match this tail behavior in each step by choosing x
pseudorandomly (which is the problem we are trying to solve), the final bound we get
would be O((log n)log log(n)/2). Using ε-biased x, we show a weaker bound of polylog(n) for
each step, giving an overall bound of d(n) = (log(n))O(log log(n)). Showing this bound for
one step requires a fair amount of technical work, it works by decomposing the vector into
weight scales and tuning the amount of independence to the scale like in [GMR+12]. We
leave open the question of whther G′ can itself give Chernoff-like tail bounds.
Next we show that one gets the desired tail behaviour by hashing variables into m =
poly(d(n)) buckets and using an independent copy of G′ for each bucket. The reason is
the output of the resulting generator can be viewed as the sum of m independent bounded
random variables, which lets us apply Bernstein’s inequality which guarantees Chernoff-like
tails for such variables. The boundedness comes from the tail guarantee of G′: since large
deviations are very unlikely, we can condition on the event that they do not occur in any
of the buckets. The final step is to reduce to seed-length, we do this by recycling the seed
for the various independent copies of G′ using the INW generator [INW94], like in [MZ13].
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Fooling signed majorities
Let us fix a test vector v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n and error ε = 1/poly(n). Fooling signed majorities
with polynomially small error is equivalent to fooling linear sums of the form 〈v, x〉 in
statistical distance with error 1/poly(n). We shall adopt this view from now on.
We start with a generator that uses iterated dimension reduction and gradually-increasing
independence as we did for derandomizing the Chernoff bound. This by itself is not enough
for fooling sums in statistical distance. The reason is that there exist small-bias spaces with
exponentially small bias that are far from fooling linear sums in statistical distance, like
the set of strings whose weight is divisible by 3 [VW08]. We design a different generator to
deal with such tests and then combine the two generators by xoring independent copies.
Next, note that showing closeness in statistical distance for discrete random variables
is equivalent to showing that their Fourier transforms are close. Using this, it suffices to
design a generator G : {±1}r → {±1}n such that for all α ∈ R, the corresponding Fourier
coefficient Ey[exp(2πiα 〈v,G(y)〉)] is close to its value under the uniform distribution. Note
that in order to fool the mod m test, it suffices to fool all α = j/m for integers j. We
consider two cases based on how large α is relative to ‖v‖0 = k.
Large α: Here we consider α ≫ 1/
√
k. This includes the case of modular tests
where the modulus is much smaller than
√
k. We fool such tests using an error reduction
procedure. We start with the generator of [GMRZ13] which requires seed-length O(log n)
to fool such tests with constant error. We then reduce the error to inverse polynomial at
the expense of a O(log log n) factor in seed-length using standard machinery from pseudo-
randomness. While technically simple, this step is the botteleneck in extending our result
to more general halfpsaces: there is no analog of the [GMRZ13] generator to start from.
Smaller α: This case which includes modular tests where the modulus is Ω(
√
k) is the
harder case and technically the most novel portion of this work. The qualitative difference
from the other case can be seen from the fact that when we sum k random bits modulo
m = ω(
√
k), the resulting distribution is no longer uniform over congruence classes.
The generator uses dimension reduction in a manner similar to what we used to de-
randomize the Chernoff bound. Like before, the plan is to show that a single dimension
reduction step does not incur too much error. However, the analysis is very different and
requires several new tools. This step critically exploits the recursive structure of the gen-
erator: to analyze the error we can work as if the variables in the reduced space are given
truly random signs and then recursively analyze the error in the reduced space. Working
with truly random bits in the smaller-dimensional space helps us reduce bounding the error
to finding good low-degree polynomial approximators for a certain product of cosines. In
the most technically, involved part of our argument we use various analytic tools to find
such low-degree approximators. One additional ingredient is that the above approach does
not actually work for all test vectors but only for sufficiently well-spread out vectors as
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measured by their ℓ2, ℓ4 norms. The final piece is to argue that the ℓ2, ℓ4 norms are not
distorted too much by the dimension reduction steps.
2 Preliminaries
We start with some notation:
• For vectors x ∈ Rn, let ‖x‖p denote the usual ℓp-norms, and let ‖x‖0 denote the size
of the support of x. For a random variable X and p > 0, let ‖X‖p = E[|X|p]1/p.
• For a multi-linear polynomial Q : Rn → R, ‖Q‖22 denotes the sum of squares of
coefficients of Q and ‖Q‖1 denotes the sum of absolute values of the coefficients.
• For vectors u, v ∈ Rn, let u ⋆ v = (uivi)ni=1 denote the coordinate-wise product.
• For v ∈ {±1}n and α ∈ R, define φv,α(x) = exp(2πiα(v · x)).
• For v ∈ Rn and a hash function h : [n]→ [m], define
h(v) =
m∑
j=1
‖v|h−1(j)‖42 (1)
• For a hash function h : [n]→ [m], let A(h) ∈ {0, 1}m×n, be the matrix with A(h)ji = 1
if and only if h(i) = j.
• For a string x ∈ {±1}n, let D(x) ∈ Rn×n be the diagonal matrix formed by x.
• For two random variables X,Y over a domain Ω, their statistical distance is defined
as dTV (X,Y ) = maxA⊆Ω |Pr[X ∈ A]− Pr[Y ∈ A]|.
• Unless otherwise stated c, C denote universal constants.
Throughout we assume that n is sufficiently large and that δ, ǫ > 0 are sufficiently small.
All vectors here will be row vectors rather than column vectors.
Definition. For n,m, δ > 0 we say that a family of hash functions H = {h : [n]→ [m]} is
δ-biased if for any r ≤ n distinct indices i1, i2, . . . , ir ∈ [n] and j1, . . . , jr ∈ [m],
Pr
h∈uH
[h(i1) = j1 ∧ h(i2) = j2 ∧ · · · ∧ h(ir) = jr] = 1
mr
± δ.
We say that such a family is k-wise independent if the above holds with δ = 0 for all
r ≤ k. We say that a distribution over {±1}n is δ-biased or k-wise independent if the
corresponding family of functions h : [n]→ [2] is.
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Such families of functions can be generated using small seeds.
Fact 3. For n,m, k, δ > 0, there exist explicit δ-biased families of hash functions h : [n]→
[m] that are generated from a seed of length s = O(log(n/δ)). There are also, explicit
k-wise independent families that are generated from a seed of length s = O(k log(nm)).
Taking the pointwise sum of such generators modulo m gives a family of hash func-
tions that is both δ-biased and k-wise independent generated from a seed of length s =
O(log(n/δ) + k log(nm)).
2.1 Basic Results
We collect some known results about pseudorandomness and prove some other technical
results that will be used later. We defer all proofs for this section to Appendix A.
We will use the following result from [GMRZ13] giving PRGs for signed majorities.
Theorem 4. [GMRZ13] For n, ε > 0 there exists an explicit pseudorandom generator,
Y ∈ {±1}n generated from a seed of length s = O(log(n) + log2(1/ǫ)) so that for any
v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n and X ∈u {±1}n, we have that dTV (v · Y, v ·X) ≤ ǫ.
We shall use PRGs for small-space machines or read-once branching programs (ROBP)
of Nisan [Nis92] and Impagliazzo, Nisan and Wigderson [INW94].
Definition 2 ((S,D, T )-ROBP). An (S,D, T )-ROBP M is a layered directed graph with
T + 1 layers and 2S vertices per layer with the following properties.
• The first layer has a single start node and the last layer has two nodes labeled 0, 1
respectively.
• A vertex v in layer i, 0 ≤ i < T has 2D edges to layer i + 1 each labeled with an
element of {0, 1}D.
A graph M as above naturally defines a function M :
({0, 1}D)T → {0, 1} where on in-
put (z1, . . . , zT ) ∈
({0, 1}D)T one traverses the edges of the graph according to the labels
z1, . . . , zT and outputs the label of the final vertex reached.
Theorem 5 ([Nis92], [INW94]). There exists an explicit PRG GINW : {0, 1}r → ({0, 1}D)T
which ǫ-fools (S,D, T )-branching programs and has seed-length r = O(D+S log T+log(T/δ)·
(log T )).
We will need to make use of the hypercontractive inequality (see [O’D14]):
Lemma 6 (Hypercontractivity). Let x ∼u {±1}n. Then, for a degree d polynomial Q and
an even integer p ≥ 2,
E [Q(x)p] ≤ (p − 1)pd/2 · ‖Q‖p2.
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Lemma 7 (Hypercontractivity δ-biased). Let x ∼ D be drawn from a δ-biased distribution.
Then, for a degree d polynomial Q and an even integer p ≥ 2,
E [Q(x)p] ≤ (p− 1)pd/2 · ‖Q‖p2 + ‖Q‖p1δ.
We will use the following Chernoff-like tail bound for small-bias spaces.
Lemma 8. For all v ∈ Rn with ‖v‖2 = 1 and x ∼ D ǫ-biased over {±1}n, and t ≥ 1
Pr [|〈v, x〉| > t] ≤ 2 exp(−t2/4) + ‖v‖t20 · ǫ.
The next two lemmas quantify load-balancing properties of δ-biased hash functions in
terms of the ℓp-norms of vectors.
Lemma 9. Let p ≥ 2 be an integer. Let v ∈ Rn and H = {h : [n] → [m]} be either a
δ-biased hash family for δ > 0 or a p-wise independent family for δ = 0. Then
E[h(v)p] ≤ O(p)2p
(‖v‖42
m
)p
+O(p)2p‖v‖4p4 +mp‖v‖4p2 δ.
Lemma 10. For all v ∈ Rn+ and H = {h : [n]→ [m]} a δ-biased family, and j ∈ [m], and
all even p ≥ 2,
Pr
[∣∣∣∥∥v|h−1(j)∥∥1 − ‖v‖1 /m
∣∣∣ ≥ t] ≤ O(p)p/2 ‖v‖p2 + ‖v‖p1 δ
tp
.
3 Derandomizing the Chernoff Bounds
In this section we present a pseudorandom generator that gives Chernoff-like tail bounds.
Theorem 11. For all δ > 0, there exists an explicit generator G : {0, 1}r → {±1}n with
seed-length r = O˜(log(n/δ)) such that for all unit vectors w ∈ Rn, and t ≥ 0,
Pr
y∈u{0,1}r
[|〈w, G(y)〉| ≥ t] ≤ 4 exp(−t2/16) + δ.
Our construction proceeds in two steps. We first construct a generator which has
moderate tail bounds but does not match the tail behaviour of truly random distribution.
We then boost the tail bounds to match the behaviour of truly random distributions using
PRGs for small-space machines.
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3.1 Moderately Decaying Tails
The main result of this section is a generator with the following tail behaviour.
Lemma 12. For n and γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists an explicit generator G′ : {0, 1}r′ → {±1}n
with seed-length r′ = O(log(n/γ) log log(n)) such that for all unit vectors w ∈ Rn,
Pr
y∈u{0,1}r
[
|〈w, G′(y)〉| ≥ (C1 log(n/γ))C2 log log(n)
]
≤ γ.
The generator G′ is recursively defined. We first specify the one-step generator G′′ that
is used in defining G′. Fix δ > 0, n. Let H = {h : [n]→ [m]} be a family of δ-biased hash
functions. Let D be a δ-biased distribution over {±1}n. The generator G′′ takes as input
a hash function h ∈ H, x ∈ D and z ∈u {±1}m, the output is
G′′(h, x, z) = zA(h)D(x).
Thus we have for any i ∈ [n],
G′′(h, x, z)j = zh(i)xi.
Thus the generator G′′ starts with the δ-biased string x ∈ D as output, hashes the coordi-
nates into [m] bins and flips the signs of all coordinates in each bin by picking a uniformly
random independent bit for each bin. This takes O(log(n/δ) +m) random bits.
The generator G′ is obtained by taking m ≈ √n and then recursively using G′′ to
generate z ∈ {±1}n. The base case of the recursion is reached when m = O(log(n/δ))
at which point we use a truly random string z. This requires k ≤ log log(n) stages of
recursion, so that the seed length is O(log(n/δ) log log(n)). Unrolling the recursion, we see
that if we set nℓ = n
2−ℓ for ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , k} then G′ takes as input two sequences:
• A sequence of hash functions h1, . . . , hk where hℓ : [nℓ−1] → [nℓ] is drawn from a
δ-biased family of hash functions.
• A sequence of strings x1, . . . , xk where xℓ ∈ {±1}nℓ is drawn from a δ-biased distri-
bution.
For each coordinate i, consider the sequence {iℓ ∈ nℓ}kℓ=0 obtained by successively applying
the hash functions:
i0 = i, iℓ = h
ℓ(iℓ−1) for ℓ ≥ 1.
Then we have
G′(h1, . . . , hk, x1, . . . , xk) =
k∏
ℓ=1
xℓiℓ .
The analysis of G′ proceeds step by step and each step reduces to analyzing G′′. Note
that
〈w, G′′(h, x, z)〉 = 〈w, zA(h)D(x)〉 = 〈A(h)D(x)wT , z〉.
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We can view A(h)D(x)wT as projection of w ∈ Rn down to Rm where we first hash
coordinates into buckets, and then sum the coordinates in a bucket with signs given by x.
The next lemma saying that the transformation A(h)D(x) is unlikely to stretch Euclidean
norms too much serves as the base case for the recursion.
Lemma 13. Let n ≥ 1 and m = √n and δ < 1/10n2. Let D be a δ-biased distribution
over {±1}n and H = {h : [n]→ [m]} be a δ-biased hash family. There exists a constant C
such that for all unit vectors w ∈ Rn,
Pr
x∈D,h∈H
[∥∥A(h)D(x)wT ∥∥
2
≥ C(log log(n)) log(1/δ)3/4
]
≤ 3(log log(n))m
√
δ
We prove this lemma by decomposing the vector w across various weight scales. Fix a
unit vector w ∈ Rn. Without loss of generality, we ignore all coordinates i where |wi| ≤ 1/n
as they can only effect the ℓ2-norm by at most 1. For ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , log log n}, define w(ℓ) ∈ Rn
as
w(ℓ)i =
{
wi if |wi| ∈
(
1
22ℓ
, 1
22ℓ−1
]
0 otherwise.
Thus w(ℓ) picks out the entries in the ℓth weight scale. In addition, define w(0) to consist
of entries that lie in the interval (1/2, 1]. We will show that for every ℓ, the bound∥∥A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T ∥∥2
2
≤ O(1) log(1/δ)1.5
holds with high (inverse polynomial) probability. Here we tailor the amount of indepen-
dence we use in the argument to the scale, in a manner similar to [CRSW13, GMR+12].
Once this is done, Lemma 13 follows by the triangle inequality.
We start with a simple bound which suffices for small constant ℓ.
Lemma 14. For all ℓ, we have ∥∥A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T ∥∥
2
≤ 22ℓ .
Proof. Observe that ∥∥A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T ∥∥∞ ≤ ‖w(ℓ)‖1∥∥A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T ∥∥
1
≤ ‖w(ℓ)‖1
hence by Holder’s inequality ∥∥A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T ∥∥
2
≤ ‖w(ℓ)‖1 .
Since ‖w(ℓ)‖2 ≤ 1 and every non-zero entry is at least 2−2
ℓ
we have ‖w(ℓ)‖1 ≤ 22
ℓ
and
hence ∥∥A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T ∥∥
2
≤ 22ℓ .
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Given this lemma, we can assume that ℓ is a sufficiently large constant. We show that
the weight vector is hashed fairly regularly with high probability over the choice of h ∈ H,
where the regularity is measured by h(v).
Lemma 15. Fix ℓ ≥ 2. Then
Pr
h∈H
[
h(w(ℓ)) ≤ 2C4
√
log(1/δ)
22ℓ−2
]
≥ 1− 2m
√
δ. (2)
Proof. By Lemma 10 applied to the vector (w(ℓ)2i )
n
i=1, there is a constant C4 such that for
even q ≥ 2
Pr
h∈H
[h(w(ℓ)) ≥ 1/m+ t] ≤ m
((
C4
√
q ‖w(ℓ)‖24
t
)q
+ δ
(
‖w(ℓ)‖22
t
)q)
.
Plugging in the bounds
‖w(ℓ)‖24 ≤ ‖w(ℓ)‖∞ ≤ 2−2
ℓ−1
, ‖w(ℓ)‖2 ≤ 1
we get
Pr
h∈H
[h(w(ℓ)) ≥ 1/m+ t] ≤ m
((
C4
√
q
22
ℓ−1
t
)q
+ δ
(
1
t
)q)
.
Therefore, taking
q =
log(1/δ)
2ℓ−1
, t =
C4
√
q
22ℓ−2
in the above equation, we get
C4
√
q ‖w(ℓ)‖24
t
≤ 2
2ℓ−2
22ℓ−1
≤ 1
22ℓ−2
,(
C4
√
q ‖w(ℓ)‖24
t
)q
≤ 1
22ℓ−2 log(1/δ)/2ℓ−1
≤
√
δ.
(
1
t
)q
≤ (22ℓ−2)log(1/δ)/2ℓ−1 = 1√
δ
.
hence
Pr
h∈H
[
h(w(ℓ)) ≥ 1/m+ C4
√
log(1/δ)
22ℓ−2
]
≤ 2m
√
δ.
Hence with probability 1− 2m√δ over the choice of h, we have
h(w(ℓ)) ≤ 1
m
+
C4
√
log(1/δ)
22ℓ−2
≤ 2C4
√
log(1/δ)
22ℓ−2
since 1/m = 1/
√
n ≤ 2−2ℓ−2 .
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Conditioned on the hash function h being good (i.e., satisfying the condition of the
previous lemma), we will show that
∥∥A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T ∥∥2
2
is small with high-probability.
Lemma 16. Fix ℓ ≥ 2 and assume that h is such that the event described in Equation (2)
holds. There exists a constant C6 such that
Pr
x∈D
[∥∥A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T ∥∥
2
≤ C6 log
(
1
δ
)5/8]
≥ 1−
√
δ − δ16. (3)
Proof. We will show that
∥∥A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T ∥∥2
2
is concentrated around its mean (which is
‖w(ℓ)‖22) by bounding its moments. The deviation is given by the polynomial
Qℓ(x) =
∥∥A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T ∥∥2
2
− ‖w(ℓ)‖22
=
∑
j∈[m]

 ∑
i∈h−1(j)
w(ℓ)ixi


2
− ‖w(ℓ)‖22
=
∑
j∈[m]
∑
i1 6=i2∈h−1(j)
w(ℓ)i1w(ℓ)i2xi1xi2
We have
E
x∈u{±1}n
[Qℓ(x)
2] =
m∑
j=1
∑
i1 6=i2∈h−1(j)
(w(ℓ)i1)
2(w(ℓ)i2)
2
≤
m∑
j=1
‖w(ℓ)|h−1(j)‖42
= h(w(ℓ)).
‖Qℓ‖1 =
∑
j∈[m]
∑
i1 6=i2∈h−1(j)
|w(ℓ)i1w(ℓ)i2 |
≤
∑
j∈m
∥∥w(ℓ)|h−1(j)∥∥21
≤ ‖w(ℓ)‖21
≤ ‖w(ℓ)‖0 .
By Lemma 7 applied to Q with d = 2, there exists a constant C3 so that for all even
p ≥ 2,
E
x∈D
[Q(x)p] ≤
(
C3p
√
h(w(ℓ))
)p
+ ‖w(ℓ)‖p0 δ. (4)
We bound h(wℓ) using Equation (2). We also have ‖w(ℓ)‖0 ≤ 22
ℓ
. Plugging these into
Equation (4),
E
x∈D
[Q(x)p] ≤ C
p
5p
p log(1/δ)p/4
22
ℓ−3p
+ 22
ℓpδ
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Now setting
p =
log(1/δ)
2ℓ+1
, θ = C5 log(1/δ)
5/4
and using Markov’ inequality gives
Pr
x∈D
[Q(x) ≥ θ] ≤
(
C5p log(1/δ)
1/4
22ℓ−3θ
)p
+
(
22
ℓ
θ
)p
δ
To bound the first term, note that(
C5p log(1/δ)
1/4
22
ℓ−3
θ
)p
≤
(
1
22
ℓ−3
)log(1/δ)/2ℓ+1
≤ δ16.
For the second term, note that since θ ≥ 1,(
22
ℓ
θ
)p
δ ≤ 22ℓ log(1/δ)/2ℓ+1δ ≤
√
δ
Therefore, except with probability at least
√
δ + δ16 we have
∥∥A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T ∥∥2
2
≤ ‖wℓ‖22 + C5 log(1/δ)5/4
hence ∥∥A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T ∥∥
2
≤ C6 log(1/δ)5/8
We now finish the proof of Lemma 13.
Proof of Lemma 13. Note that
w =
log log(n)∑
i=0
w(ℓ).
We will assume that h and x are chosen so that the conditions in Equations (2) and (3)
hold for all ℓ. By the union bound, this happens except with probability
log log(n)(2m
√
δ +
√
δ + δ16) < 3 log log(n)m
√
δ.
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In which case, we have
‖A(h)D(x)w‖2 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
log log(n)∑
ℓ=0
A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
log log(n)∑
ℓ=0
∥∥A(h)D(x)w(ℓ)T ∥∥
2
≤ C6 log log(n) log(1/δ)5/8
≤ C6 log(1/δ)3/4 .
We now prove the main lemma of this section:
Proof of Lemma 12. Let k = log log(n) be the number of recursive stages. Let w be a unit
vector. Given h1, . . . , hk and x1, . . . , xk, we have
〈w, G′(h1, . . . , hk, x1, . . . , xk)〉 =
k∏
ℓ=1
A(hℓ)D(xℓ)wT
Let C8n
√
δ = γ, so that δ = Ω(γ2/n2). Note that log(1/δ) ≫ log log(n)4.
By applying Lemma 13 inductively and using the union bound, except with probability
3(log log(n))2m
√
δ ≤ C8n
√
δ
we have that for every i ≤ k∥∥∥∥∥
i∏
ℓ=1
A(hℓ)D(xℓ)wT
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ (C6 log log(n) log(1/δ)3/4)i ≤ log(1/δ)i/2
and hence
|〈w, G′(h1, . . . , hk, x1, . . . , xk)〉| ≤ log(1/δ)log log(n)/2.
Thus, with probability 1− γ, the deviation is bounded by
d(n, γ) := (C1 log(n/γ))
C2 log log(n)
and the seedlength of this generator is
r′ = O(log(n/δ) log log(n)) = O(log(n/γ) log log(n)).
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3.2 Getting sub-Gaussian tail bounds
The generator G′ gives a tail probability of 1 − γ pseudorandomly for d(n, γ) standard
deviations. We now boost this to obtain sub-Gaussian tails by starting with independent
copies of G′ and then reuse the seeds for using a PRG for space bounded computations.
We will make some added assumptions about G′:
• The output is ε-biased for some ε ≪ γ. We can ensure this by xor-ing the output
with an ε-biased string.
• The distribution is symmetric: for every x, Pry[G′(y) = x] = Pry[G′(y) = −x]. We
ensure this by outputting either G′(y) or −G′(y) with probability 1/2.
Let D1,D2 be constants such that
m = (D1 log(n/γ))
D2 log log(n) > 10d(n, γ)2 log(1/γ).
Note that for γ = 1/poly(n), log(m) = O(log log(n)2).
Let H = {h : [n]→ [m]} be a family of γ-biased hash functions. Define a new generator
G¯ : ({0, 1}r)m ×H → {±1}n as follows:
G¯(z1, . . . , zT , h)i = G′(zj)i, if h(i) = j. (5)
The seed-length of the generator is r¯ = log(n/δ) +m · r′ which we will later improve to
log(n/δ) + r′ + log(n/γ) log(m) using PRGs for space bounded computations.
The following claim characterizes the tail behaviour of the output of G¯.
Lemma 17. Let 0 < ε < γ ≤ 1/n3. For all unit vectors w ∈ Rn, the generator G¯ satisfies
Pr
y∈{0,1}r¯
[∣∣〈w, G¯(y)〉∣∣ ≥ t] ≤ 4(exp(−t2/16) +m√γ + (1/γ)4 log(m)ε).
Proof. Note that it suffices to prove the claim for t ≤ 2
√
log(1/γ) since tail probabilities
can only decrease with t and beyond this value, the tail bound is dominated by the additive
terms.
Fix a unit vector w ∈ Rn. Let
β =
1
m2
√
log(1/γ)
(6)
and define u, v ∈ Rn to consist of the heavy and light indices respectively
ui =
{
wi if |wi| ≥ β
0 otherwise.
, vi =
{
wi if |wi| < β
0 otherwise.
.
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Since w = u+ v, it suffices to bound the probability that either of |〈u, G¯(y)〉| and |〈v, G¯y〉|
exceed t/2. We will consider u first. Note that
‖u‖0 ≤
1
β2
≤ m4 log
(
1
γ
)
.
Since G¯(y) is ε-biased, by Lemma 8 applied for t/2 ≤
√
log(1/γ),
Pr
[∣∣〈u, G¯(y)〉∣∣ > t/2] ≤ 2 exp(−t2/16) + ‖u‖log(1/γ)0 ε
≤ 2 exp(−t2/16) + (m log(1/γ))log(1/γ)ε. (7)
We will show a tail bound for 〈v, G¯(y)〉 by bounding its higher order moments. Fix a
hash function h ∈u H and for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let
Zj = 〈v|h−1(j), G′(zj)〉.
Note that the random variables Zj are independent of one another, and
〈v, G¯(y)〉 =
m∑
j=1
Zj .
We use Lemma 10 to bound
∥∥v|h−1(j)∥∥2. We defer the proof of the following technical
lemma.
Lemma 18. With probability 1− 2m√γ, for all j ∈ [m] we have∥∥v|h−1(j)∥∥22 ≤ 2m (8)
We condition on the hash function h satisfying Equation (8), and call this event A.
Recall that Zj = 〈v|h−1(j), G′(zj)〉. By Lemma 12, with probability 1 − γ over zj , we
have the bound
|Zj | ≤ d(n, γ)
∥∥v|h−1(j)∥∥2 ≤
√
2d(n, γ)√
m
≤ 1
2
√
log(1/γ)
:=M (9)
where the last inequality is by the choice of m. By the union bound, Equation (9) holds
with probability at least 1 −mγ over z1, . . . , zm, for all j ∈ [m]. We further condition on
the event |Zj | ≤M for all j ∈ [m] which we denote by B.
Conditioning on a high probability event preserves the small-bias property of G(zj)’s
up to a small additive error. In particular, conditioned on the event B, G′(zj) is (ε+mγ)-
biased. Since
∥∥v|h−1(j)∥∥1 ≤ √n we have
m∑
j=1
E[Z2j |B] ≤
m∑
j=1
(
∥∥v|h−1(j)∥∥22 + n(ε+mγ))
≤ 1 + nm(ε+mγ)
≤ 2.
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Further, since G′(zj) is symmetric, it continues to be symmetric after we condition on B
(which is a symmetric event in G′(zj)).
Since t/2 ≤
√
log(1/γ), and M = 1/2
√
log(1/γ) we have Mt ≤ 1/2. We now apply
Bernstein’s inequality [Fel71] to the random variables {Zj |B}mj=1 which are mean zero and
are bounded by M to get
Pr


∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
j=1
Zj |B
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > t/2

 ≤ 2 exp
(
− t
2
4(
∑
j ‖Zj|B‖22 +Mt/3)
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− t
2
28/3
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− t
2
16
)
.
Combining the above arguments, we get that
Pr
[∣∣〈v, G′(y)〉∣∣ > t/2] ≤ 2 exp(−t2/16) + 2m√γ. (10)
The claim now follows from combining Equations (10) and (7)
Proof of Lemma 18. Note that
‖v ⋆ v‖1 ≤ 1, ‖v ⋆ v‖2 = ‖v‖24 ≤ β.
Therefore, by setting
p =
log(1/γ)
log(1/β)
, t = D6
√
βp
in Lemma 10 we get
Pr
h∈H
[∥∥v|h−1(j)∥∥22 ≥ 1m +D6
√
β
log(1/γ)
log(1/β)
]
≤ D
p
6p
pβp + γ
(D6
√
βp)p
≤ 2√γ.
By a union bound, with probability at least 1− 2m√γ over h, for all j ∈ [m],
∥∥v|h−1(j)∥∥22 ≤ 1m +
√
β
log(1/γ)
log(1/β)
≤ 2
m
where the last inequality follows from our choice of β in Equation (6).
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3.3 Putting things together
We are now ready to prove Theorem 11.
Proof of Theorem 11. Let G¯ :
(
{0, 1}r′
)m
×H → {±1}n be the generator as in Lemma 17.
Let δ be the final additive error desired. Set
γ =
δ2
(D5 log(n/δ))D6 log log(n)
≤ δ
2
50m2
ε =
(
δ
n
)D7 log log(n/δ)3
≤ δ
20γ4 log(m)
.
It can be verified that with these parameter seedings, the error probability in Lemma 17
is at most 4e−t2/16+ δ, and the seed-length of G¯ is log(n/γ)+mr′, where r′ = O(log(n/δ) ·
(log log(n/δ))3).
Observe that once we fix the has function h, the inner product 〈w, G′(z1, . . . , zm, h)〉
can be computed by a (S, r′,m)-ROBP where S = O(log n) which reads one z1, z2, . . . , zm
in order. The reason is that we can round each weight wi up to a multiple of 1/n
2. This
can only increase |〈w, z〉| by 1/n for any z ∈ {±1}n. This also ensures that 〈w, z〉 lies in
the interval [−√n,√n] and that it is a multiple of 1/n2 and thus can be computed with
O(log n)-bits of precision.
Now, let GINW : {0, 1}rs →
(
{0, 1}r′
)m
be a generator fooling O(S, r′,m)-ROBP with
error δ. By Theorem 5, there exist such generators with seed-length
rs = O(r
′ + (log n)(logm) + log(m/δ) · (logm)) = O((log(n/δ))(log log(n/δ))3).
Now, if we define our final generator Gf : H× {0, 1}rs → {±1}n by
Gf (h, z) = G′(GINW (z), h).
From the above arguments it follows that the output of Gf only has an additional δ error
compared to G′. The theorem now follows from the above bound on seed-length.
4 A PRG for signed majorities
In this section we construct generator to fool signed majorities to polynomial error with
seedlength O˜(log n) proving Theorem 2. As the generator and its analysis is quite technical,
we first give a high-level description at the risk of repeating parts of Section 1.3.
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Proof overview
For simplicity, in this discussion let us fix a test vector v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n and error ǫ =
1/poly(n). We start by noting that it suffices to design a PRG G : {0, 1}r → {±1}n such
that dTV (〈v,G(y)〉 , 〈v,X〉) ≪ 1/poly(n) where y ∈u {0, 1}r and X ∈u {±1}n. In the
following let X ∈u {±1}n and Y ∼ G(y), where y ∈u {0, 1}r be the output of the desired
generator.
The starting point of our analysis and construction is to note that showing closeness in
statistical distance for discrete random variables is equivalent to showing that the Fourier
transforms of the random variables are close. This will allow us to use various analytic
tools. Concretely, we shall use the following elementary fact about the discrete Fourier
transform.
Claim 2. Let Z1, Z2 be two discrete random variables with support sizes at most B. Then,
dTV (Z1, Z2) ≤
√
2B ·max
α∈R
|E[exp(2πiαZ1)]− E[exp(2πiαZ2)]| .
Proof. Note that the distribution Z1 − Z2 is supported on at most 2B points. Therefore,
dTV (Z1, Z2) = ‖Z1 − Z2‖1 ≤
√
2B‖Z1 − Z2‖2.
On the other hand, the Plancherel identity implies that
‖Z1 − Z2‖2 ≤ max
α∈R
|E[exp(2πiαZ1)]− E[exp(2πiαZ2)]| .
This completes the proof.
Henceforth, we will focus on designing a generator so as to fool the test function
exp(2πiα 〈v, x〉) ≡ φv,α(x). To do so, we will consider two cases based on how large α ∈
[0, 1] is. The two cases we consider capture the shift in the behaviour of E[exp(2πα(v ·X))]
- the “α-th Fourier coefficient”. We can combine the generators for the two cases easily at
the end.
Large α: α≫ (log n)O(1)/√‖v‖0
Roughly speaking, the reason for considering this threshold is that all values of α greater
than this value yield similar Fourier coefficients: |E[φv,α(X)]| ≪ 1/poly(n) for α in this
range. Thus, it suffices to ensure that E[φv,α(Y )] is small. We achieve this by exhibiting a
way to “amplify” the error, i.e., go from fooling φv,α with constant error to fooling them
with polynomially small error at the expense of a O(log log n) factor in seed-length. We
then instantiate this amplification procedure with the generator of Gopalan, Meka, Rein-
gold, Zuckerman [GMRZ13] which requires seed-length O(log n) to fool such test functions
(φv,α( )) with constant error. We leave the details of the amplification procedure to the
corresponding section.
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Small α: α≪ (log n)O(1)/√‖v‖0
This is the harder of the two cases and the core of our construction and analysis. The
generator we use is essentially the same as the one based on iterative dimension reduction
used in derandomizng the Chernoff bound. The main difference will be that instead of
using small-bias spaces in each dimension reduction step we use k-wise independent spaces
for suitable k. However, the analysis is quite different and requires several new analytic
tools.
We next formally describe our generator for handling this case. Let n, δ > 0. Let C be
a sufficiently large constant. We define a generator as follows. Let n = n1 > n2 > . . . > nt
so that ni+1 = n
1/2
i + O(1) and log
2C(n/δ) ≥ nt ≥ logC(n/δ). Note that this implies
that t = O(log log(n)). For 1 ≤ i < t, let Hi = {h : [ni] → [ni+1]} be a family of
C log(n/δ)
log(ni)
-wise independent hash functions. Let hi ∈u Hi. Let Zi be a random element
of {±1}ni chosen from a distribution that is both (δ/n)C -biased and and C log(n/δ)log(ni) -wise
independent. Finally, let Z be a random variable in {±1}nt be chosen to fool weight at
most n halfspaces to variational distance δ/n as described in Theorem 4. We define our
random variable Y ∈ {±1}n to be
Y = ZA(ht−1)D(Zt−1)A(ht−2)D(Zt−2) · · ·A(h1)D(Z1). (11)
Informally, this generator begins with the string Z1, then uses h1 to divide the coordi-
nates into n2 bins and then for each bin multiplies the elements in this bin by a random
sign, these n2 signs being chosen recursively by a similar generator, until at the final level
they are picked using the generator from Theorem 4 instead.
It is easy to see from Theorem 4 and Fact 3 that the random variable Y can be produced
from a random seed of length s = O(log(n/δ) log log(n/δ)). We also claim that it fools
φv,α for |α| ≤ log3(1/δ)/‖v‖2 . This in turn implies our claimed pseudorandomness for
halfspaces in lieu of Claim 2.
To analyze the generator we shall use a hybrid argument to exploit the recursive nature
of the generator. To this end, for 1 ≤ i < t, let Xi ∈u {±1}ni and define
Yi := XiA(hi−1)D(Zi−1) · · ·A(h1)D(Z1) (12)
(note that Y1 = X1) and let Yt = Y .
The crux of the analysis is then in showing the following claim analyzing a single
dimension reduction step: for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and α ≤ log3(1/δ)/ ‖v‖2,
|E[φv,α(Yi)]− E[φv,α(Yi+1)]| ≤ δ/n.
If we let v0 = v and vi = A(hi−1)D(Zi−1 · · ·A(h1)D(Z1)v, then the above claim amounts
to bounding
|E[φvi,α(Xi)]− E[φvi,α(Xi−1A(hi)D(Zi))]| . (13)
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Thus, intuitively, we need to argue that a single step of dimension reduction (i.e.,
applying A(hi)D(Zi)) does not cause too much error. Ideally, we would have liked to make
such a claim for all test functions of the form φw,α; this turns out to be false. What
remains true however is that a single dimension reduction step fools test functions of the
form φw,α when the test vector w ∈ Rni is sufficiently well-spread out (as measured by the
ℓ2, ℓ4-norms of w) and α is not too large. In particular, in the most technically intensive
part of our argument we bound the error from the above step as a function of the ℓ2, ℓ4
norms of the vector vi. We then argue separately that the ℓ2, ℓ4 norms of the test vector v
are close to their true values under the above transformations.
In order to analyze expectations as in Equation 13, it is critical to note that Xi−1 is
uniformly distributed. This implies (for fixed hi) that the given expectation over Xi−1 is
a product of cosines of linear functions of Zi. We take advantage of the fact that cosine
is a smooth function of its input, allowing us to approximate this product by a Taylor
polynomial. If α is sufficiently small, the higher order terms will be small enough to
ignore, and therefore the limited independence of Zi will be sufficient to guarantee the
desired approximation.
4.1 Generator for large α
We now develop a generator that works when α is large, in particular, we prove:
Proposition 19. There exists an explicit generator Gb : {0, 1}r → {±1}n with seed-
length r = O((log(n/ǫ))(log log(n))) such that the following holds. For all v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n,
α ∈ (−1/4, 1/4) with α ≥ log3(1/ǫ)/ ‖v‖2,∣∣∣∣ E
y∈u{0,1}r
[
φv,α(G
b(y))
]
− E
X∈u{±1}n
[φv,α(X)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ.
4.1.1 Spreading hashes
In order to prove Proposition 19 we will need to study a certain property of hash families.
Definition 3. A family of hash functions H = {h : [n] → [m]} is said to be (k, ℓ, ǫ)-
spreading if the following holds: for every I ⊆ [n] with |I| ≥ k, and h ∈u H with probability
at least 1− ǫ, then for all j ∈ [m], |h−1(j) ∩ I| ≤ |I|/ℓ.
The above definition quantifies the intuition that when a sufficiently large (so that
standard tail bounds apply) collection of items I ⊆ [n] is hashed into m bins, the max-load
is not much more than the average load of |I|/m. It will be important for us to be able to
construct such families explicitly.
Lemma 20. For all ǫ ≥ 0, there exists an explicit hash family H = {h : [n]→ [m]} where
m = O(log5(1/ǫ)) which is ((log5(1/ǫ)), log(1/ǫ), ǫ)-spreading and h ∈u H can be sampled
with O(log(n/ǫ)) bits.
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Proof. Let m = Θ(log5(1/ǫ)) and let H = {h : [n] → [m]} be a δ-biased family for
δ = exp(−C(log(1/ǫ))) for C a sufficiently large constant. We argue that H satisfies the
conditions of the lemma by standard moment bounds.
Let p = 2 log(1/ǫ)/ log log(1/ǫ)). Let |I| > log5(1/ǫ) and let v ∈ {0, 1}n be the indicator
vector of the set I. Note that if some h has |h−1(j) ∩ I| > |I|/ log(1/ǫ) for some j, then
h(v) ≥ |I|2/ log2(1/ǫ) (recall the definition of h(v) from Equation 1). Therefore, by Lemma
9 and Markov’s inequality, the probability that this happens is at most
E[h(v)p] log2p(1/ǫ)
|I|2p ≤ O
(
p2 log2(1/ǫ)
m
+ p2 log2(1/ǫ)|I|−1
)p
+mp log2p(1/ǫ)δ
= O(log(1/ǫ))−p +O(log(1/ǫ))5pδ
≤ ǫ.
4.1.2 The PRG
We begin with a simpler version of our generator which has the desired pseudorandomness
property but has too large a seed. We will then improve the seed-length using PRGs for
small-space machines.
Let H = {h : [n] → [m]} be a (k,C log(1/ǫ), ǫ)-spreading family for parameters k,C, ǫ
to be chosen later. Let GCS : {0, 1}r → {±1}n be a generator as in Theorem 4 with error
1/4. Now, define the generator Gb : H× ({0, 1}r)m → {±1}n as follows: for i ∈ [n],
Gb(h, z1, z2, . . . , zm)i = G
CS(zh(i))i. (14)
We claim that the above generator fools tests of the form φv,α( ) for ‖v‖0 ≥ k and
α≫ √m/‖v‖2.
Lemma 21. Let C be a sufficiently large constant. Let H = {h : [n] → [m]} for some
m ≥ log(1/ǫ) be a (k, ℓ, ǫ/4)-spreading family with ℓ = C log(1/ǫ). Let GCS be a generator
as in Theorem 4 with error 1/4. Let Y ∈ {±1}n be the output of the generator Gb as
defined in Equation (14) on a uniformly random seed and X ∈u {±1}n. Then, for all
v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n with ‖v‖0 ≥ k, and C
√
m/‖v‖2 ≤ α ≤ 1/4,
|E[φv,α(Y )]− E[φv,α(X)]| ≤ ǫ.
Proof. Fix the test vector v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n. Let I = Supp(v) and let |I| = K ≥ k. Let
Y = Gb(h, z1, z2, . . . , zm) and for j ∈ [m], let Y j = GCS(zj) and let Xj ∈u {±1}n be
independent uniformly random strings. Suppose that the hash function h ∈u H is such
that the condition of (k, ℓ, ǫ/4)-spreading holds for I. This assumption only incurs an
additive ǫ/2 in the error.
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First note that,
E[φv,α(X)] = (cos 2πα)
K ≤ exp(−Ω(α2K)) ≤ exp(−Cm) ≤ ǫ/4.
Thus, we need only show that
E[φv,α(Y )] ≤ ǫ/4.
Now, for j ∈ [m] let vj = vh−1(j) and Kj = |I ∩ h−1(j)|. Observe that by definition,
dTV (v
j · Y j, vj ·Xj) ≤ 1/4. Therefore,∣∣E[φvj ,α(Y j)]− E[φvj ,α(Xj)]∣∣ ≤ 1/2.
Further,
E[φvj ,α(X
j)] = (cos 2πα)Kj = exp(−Ω(α2Kj)).
Combining the above two equations, we get
|E[φv,α(Y )]| =
∣∣∣∣∣
m∏
i=1
E[φvj ,α(Y
j)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
m∏
i=1
min
((
1
2
+ exp(−Ω(α2Kj))
)
, 1
)
.
Now, because h has the well-spreading property, Kj = |h−1(j) ∩ I| ≤ |I|/ℓ for all
j ∈ [m]. On the other hand, ∑j Kj = K. Since the sum of the Kj which are at most
K/(2m) totals at most K/2 and since none of the other Kj are too large, there must be
at least ℓ/2 values of j so that Kj ≥ K/(2m). For these j we have that
1
2
+ exp(−Ω(α2Kj)) ≤ 1
2
+ exp(−Ω((C2m/K)(K/2m))) = 1
2
+ exp(−Ω(C)) ≤ 3
4
for C sufficiently large. Thus, for C sufficiently large
|E[φv,α(Y )]| ≤
(
3
4
)ℓ/2
≤ ǫ/4.
This completes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 19.
Proof of Proposition 19. Let C be a sufficiently large constant, m = C log5(1/ǫ), let H =
{h : [n] → [m]} be a (k, ℓ, ǫ/4)-spreading family with k ≤ C log5(1/ǫ), and ℓ = C log(1/ǫ)
as given in Lemma 20. Note that if 1/4 ≥ α ≥ log3(1/ǫ)/‖v‖2 for some α, it must be the
case that ‖v‖0 ≥ log6(1/ǫ) ≥ k. Therefore, Lemma 21 provides us with a generator, Gb,
so that for any such α that if Y is an output of Gb and X a uniform random element of
{±1}n and if ‖v‖0 ≥ k, then
|E[φv,α(Y )]− E[φv,α(X)]| ≤ ǫ/2.
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Unfortunately, the seed-length of Gb is log(H) + O(log n) ·m. We improve this using the
PRGs for ROBPs of Theorem 5. It is easy to see that for a fixed hash function h and
test vector v, the computation of
〈
v,Gb(h, z1, . . . , zm)
〉
can be done by a (S,D,m)-ROBP
where S = O(log n) and D = O(log n). Thus, we can further derandomize the choice of
z1, . . . , zm using the PRG from Theorem 5. Formally, let G
INW : {0, 1}r → ({0, 1}D)m be
a generator fooling (S,D,m)-ROBPs as in Theorem 5 with error ǫ/4 and define
Gf (h, z) = Gb(h,GINW (z)).
Then, from the above arguments it follows that Gf fools φv,α with error at most ǫ and
has seed-length O(log(n/ǫ) · (log log(n/ǫ))) proving the claim.
4.2 Generator for small α
We next argue that the generator defined in Equation 11 fools Fourier coefficients φv,α for
sufficiently small α. The main claim of this section is the following.
Proposition 22. Let v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n and α ∈ R with |α| ≤ log3(1/δ)/‖v‖2 . Let C be a
sufficiently large constant and let δ > 0. Let Y be as defined by Equation (11) and let
X ∈u {±1}n. Then
|E[φv,α(Y )]− E[φv,α(X)]| ≤ δ.
As described in the overview, we will prove the claim by a hybrid argument. For ease
of notation, we repeat some notation from the overview section. For 1 ≤ i < t, letting Xi
be a uniform random element of {±1}ni we define
Yi := XiA(hi−1)D(Zi−1) · · ·A(h1)D(Z1) (15)
(note that Y1 = X1) and let Yt = Y . Our Proposition will follow from the following Lemma.
Lemma 23. With Yi defined as above for C sufficiently large and v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n and
α ∈ R with |α| ≤ log3(1/δ)/‖v‖2 , then for t > i ≥ 1
|E[φv,α(Yi+1)]− E[φv,α(Yi)]| ≤ δ/n.
The proof of the Lemma 23 will be further split into two main cases based upon whether
or not the vector v is sparse relative to ni. Intuitively, the case of sparse v is easier as
hashing takes care of most issues here.
4.2.1 Analysis for sparse vectors
We begin with the case where v is sparse.
Lemma 24. With Yi, C, n, v, α, δ as in Lemma 23 with i < t, if ‖v‖30 < ni+1 then
|E[φv,α(Yi+1)]− E[φv,α(Yi)]| ≤ δ/n.
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Proof. We claim that this holds even after fixing the values of hj , Zj for all j < i. In
particular, if we let
w = vD(X1)A(h1)
T · · ·D(hi−1)A(hi−1)T
then we need to show that
|E[φw,α(Xi+1A(hi)D(Zi))] − E[φw,α(Xi)]| ≤ δ/n.
We will show the stronger claim that
dTV (w ·Xi+1A(hi)D(Zi), w ·Xi) ≤ δ/(2n).
Intuitively, this will hold because v (and hence w) is sparse. This means that with high
probability hi will cause few collisions within the support of w. If this is the case, then Zi
will nearly randomize the relative signs of elements mapped to the same bin and Xi will
randomize the signs between bins. To show that we have few collisions, we will need the
following lemma:
Lemma 25. Let n and m be positive integers, ǫ > 0 and C a sufficiently large constant. Let
H = {h : [n] → [m]} be a k-wise independent family of hash functions for k = C log(m/ǫ)log(m) .
Let I ⊂ [n] be such that |I|3 ≤ m. Then for h ∈u H, with probability at least 1− ǫ we have
that
|I| − |h(I)| ≤ k.
Proof. Note that if |I| − |h(I)| > k then at least k elements of I were sent to the same
location as some other element of I. This implies that there must be at least k/3 disjoint
pairs of elements xi, yi ∈ I so that h(xi) = h(yi) (for each element j ∈ [m] so that
|h−1(j)| = ℓ > 1 we can find at least ℓ/3 pairs). Thus, it suffices to show that the
expected number of collections of distinct elements x1, y1, x2, y2, . . . , xk/3, yk/3 ∈ I so that
h(xi) = h(yi) for each i is less than ǫ. On the other hand, the number of sequences xi, yi ∈ I
is at most |I|2k/3 and the probability that any given sequence has the desired property is
m−k/3 by k-wise independence of h. Thus the expected number of such sets of pairs is at
most
|I|2k/3m−k/3 ≤ m2k/9m−k/3 = m−k/9 ≤ ǫ.
This completes the proof.
Applying this lemma to I = supp(w), we find that except with probability δ/(4n) we
have that at most log(n/δ) elements of I collide with any other element of I under hi. Let
J be the set of such coordinates. It is clear that the distribution of w · (Xi+1A(hi)D(Zi))
as we vary Xi+1 depends only on hi and the signs of the Zi on the coordinates of J . On
the other hand, it is easy to see that the restriction of Zi to these coordinates is within
2|J |(δ/n)C < δ/(4n) of uniform. Thus,
δ/(2n) ≥ dTV (w·(Xi+1A(hi)D(Zi)), w·(Xi+1A(hi)D(Xi))) = dTV (w·Xi+1A(hi)D(Zi), w·Xi).
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Where the equality above is because (Xi+1A(hi)D(Xi)) and Xi are identically distributed.
This completes the proof.
4.2.2 Analysis for dense vectors
For relatively dense vectors v, we will need a different, more analytic approach. The
following crucial lemma analyzes the effect of a single dimension reduction step and bounds
the error in terms of the norms of the test vector v. We will then apply the lemma
iteratively.
Lemma 26. Let δ > 0, n,m ≥ 1, and p ≥ 2 and even integer. Let D be a 2p-wise
independent distribution over {±1}n and H = {h : [n] → [m]} be a 2p-wise independent
hash family. Then, for all v ∈ Rn, X ∈u {±1}n,Y ∼ D, h ∈u H and Z ∈u {±1}m,
|E[φv,α(Z ·A(h) ·D(Y ))]−E[φv,α(Z ·A(h) ·D(X))]| < O(p)2p
(
α4‖v‖42
m
+ α4‖v‖44
)p/8
.
(16)
To prove the lemma we shall exploit the independence of the zi’s in Equation (18) to
reduce the problem to that of analyzing a product of cosines as in the following lemma.
The lemma gives a low-degree (multivariate) polynomial approximation for a product of
cosines.
Lemma 27. For all α ∈ (0, 1/4) and even integer p, there exists a polynomial P : Rm → R
of degree at most p such that for all S1, . . . , Sm, T ∈ R,
m∏
j=1
cos(2παSj) = exp(−2π2α2T ) ·

p/2−1∑
t=0
(−2π2α2 (∑mi=1 S2i − T ))t
t!
P (Si)

 (17)
+O(1)p

(α2
(
m∑
i=1
S2i − T
))p/2
+
(
α2
(
m∑
i=1
S2i − T
))p
+
(
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
4
)p/8
+
(
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
4
)p/2 .
Proof of Lemma 26. Let Y s = ZA(h)D(Y ). We first fix a hash function h ∈ H and then
bound the error as a function of the hash function. We then average the error bound for
a uniformly random hash function from H using Lemma 9.
For j ∈ [m], let random variable Sj =
∑
i:h(i)=j viYi. Note that 〈v, Y s〉 =
∑m
j=1 zjSj .
Therefore, as z ∈u {±1}m,
E
z
[φv,α(Y
s)] =
m∏
j=1
cos(2παSj).
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Let T =
∑
j E[S
2
j ] = ‖v‖22. Let Q(X) ≡ R(S1, . . . , Sm) denote the degree 2p polyno-
mial corresponding in the first term of Equation (17), and let E(X) be the error term
corresponding to the second term. Then, from the above calculations,
E
z
[φv,α(X
s)] = Q(X) + E(X).
Observe that
Q2(X) := α
2(
m∑
j=1
S2j − T ) = α2
m∑
j=1
∑
i 6=i′∈h−1(j)
vivi′XiXi′ , (18)
is a degree two polynomial in X with, ‖Q2‖22 ≤ α4h(v) (recall Equation (1)).
By hypercontractivity - Lemma 6, for all even r ≤ p,
E[Q2(X1, . . . ,Xn)
r] ≤ O(r)r (α4h(v))r/2 .
A similar calculation for the polynomial Q4(X1, . . . ,Xn) := α
4(
∑
j S
4
j ) shows that for
all even r ≤ p/2,
E[Q4(X1, . . . ,Xn)
r] ≤ O(r)2r (α4h(v))r .
By 2p-wise independence, the above bounds also hold for E[Q2(Y )
r],E[Q4(Y )
r].
Now, let Xs = ZA(h)D(X), where X ∈u {±1}n. Then, clearly Xs ∈u {±1}n. Com-
bining the above expressions and noting that they also work for X ∈u {±1}n, we get∣∣∣∣EX Ez [φv,α(Xs)]− EY Ez [φv,α(Y s)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ |E [Q(X) −Q(Y )]|+ E[|E(X)|] + E[|E(Y )|]
≤ 0 +O(p)p (α4h(v))p/4 +O(p)p (α4h(v))p/8
≤ O(p)p (α4h(v))p/8 .
By taking expectation with respect to h ∈u H and applying Lemma 9, we get
|E[φv,α(Xs)]− E[φv,α(Y s)]| ≤ O(p)2p
(
α4‖v‖42
m
+ α4‖v‖44
)p/8
,
proving the lemma.
We defer the proof of Lemma 27 to Section 4.2.5 and continue with the analysis of our
generator. We do so by applying Lemma 26 iteratively to the vectors
vi := vD(Z1)A(h1)
T · · ·D(Zi−1)A(hi−1)T .
In order for it to be useful, we need to have good bounds on the low order moments of the
vi. We deal with these issues in the next section.
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4.2.3 Controlling moments
In particular we will need the following Lemma:
Lemma 28. Let v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n with ‖v‖0 ≥ logC/4(n/δ). Let Zi, hi, vi be defined as above.
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ t we have with probability at least 1− δ/(4n) that
‖vi‖2 ≤ 2i‖v‖2 and ‖vi‖4 ≤ ‖v‖2
min(‖v‖1/32 , n1/20i )
.
In order to prove this we will first need some controls over how the procedure used to
obtain vi+1 from vi affects these norms. In particular, we show:
Lemma 29. Let p ≥ 2 be an even integer. Let H = {h : [n] → [m]} be a 4p-wise
independent hash family and D be a 4p-wise independent distribution over {±1}n. Then,
for h ∈u H, x ∼ D and a vector v ∈ Rn,
E
[(
‖v‖22 −
∥∥vD(x)A(h)T ∥∥2
2
)p]
≤ O(p)2p
(‖v‖42
m
)p/2
+O(p)2p‖v‖2p4 .
Similarly,
E[
∥∥vD(x)A(h)T ∥∥4p
4
] ≤ O(p)4p
(‖v‖42
m
)p
+O(p)4p‖v‖4p4 .
Proof. Note that in either case the independence is sufficient that the expectations would be
the same if x and h were chosen uniformly at random from {±1}n and [m][n], respectively.
Applying Lemma 6 to the polynomial Ph(x) = ‖vD(x)A(h)T ‖22−‖v‖22, we find that for
fixed h
E
x
[Ph(x)
p] ≤ O(p)ph(v)p/2.
Averaging over h and applying Lemma 9 yields the first line.
Applying Lemma 6 to the polynomial Qh(x) = ‖vD(x)A(h)T ‖44, we find that for fixed
h,
E
x
[
∥∥vD(x)A(h)T ∥∥4p
4
] ≤ O(p)2ph(v)p.
Taking an expectation over h and applying Lemma 9, we get that
E[
∥∥vD(x)A(h)T ∥∥4p
4
] ≤ O(p)4p
(‖v‖42
m
)p
+O(p)4p‖v‖4p4 .
This completes the proof.
We are now prepared to prove Lemma 28.
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Proof of Lemma 28. We proceed by induction on i proving that the desired inequalities
hold with probability at least 1− i(δ/n)2. As a base case we consider i so that ‖v‖30 ≤ ni.
In this case, by repeated application of Lemma 25, we find that with at least the desired
probability that ‖v‖0−‖vi‖0 ≤ i log(n/δ). This implies that other than its zero coefficients,
vi has ‖v‖0 − 2i log(n/δ) coefficients of norm 1, and at most i log(n/δ) other coefficients
each of norm at most i log(n/δ). This means that
‖vi‖22 = ‖v‖22 +O(i3 log3(n/δ)), and ‖vi‖44 = ‖v‖22 +O(i5 log5(n/δ)).
Our bounds follow immediately.
Otherwise, for ‖v0‖6 > ni, we proceed by induction on i. As a base case, note that the
desired inequalities hold for i = 1 as v1 = v, and ‖v‖4 =
√
‖v‖2. We claim that if ‖vi‖
satisfies the desired inequalities, then vi+1 also does with probability at least 1 − (δ/n)2.
Note that vi+1 = viD(Zi)A(hi)
T . Note also that Zi and hi are k-wise independent for
k = C log(n/δ)/ log(ni). Applying Lemma 29 with p = ⌊k/4⌋, we find that
E
[(‖vi‖22 − ‖vi+1‖22)2p] ≤ O(p)4p
(‖vi‖42
ni+1
)p
+O(p)4p‖vi‖4p4 ,
and
E[‖vi+1‖4p4 ] ≤ O(p)4p
(‖vi‖42
ni+1
)p
+O(p)4p‖vi‖4p4 .
Applying the Markov bound to the first of these equations we find that the probability
that ‖vi+1‖22 ≥ ‖vi‖22 + 4i‖v‖22 is at most(
O(p4)
ni+1
)p
+O
(
p‖vi‖4
‖v‖2
)4p
≤ n−p/2i+1 +O(pn−1/10i+1 )4p
≤ n−p/2i+1 + n−p/11i+1
≤ (δ/n)2/2.
Where the first inequality above is by the inductive hypothesis. This implies that ‖vi+1‖2 ≤
2i+1‖v‖2 with the desired probability.
Applying the Markov bound to the latter of these equations we find that the probability
that ‖vi+1‖4 > ‖v‖2/n1/20i+1 is at most
O
(
p4‖vi‖42
‖v‖42n4/5i+1
+
p4‖vi‖44n1/5i+1
‖v2‖42
)p
≤ O
(
n
−1/2
i +
n
1/5
i+1
n
1/5
i
)p
≤ O(n−1/10i )p ≤ (δ/n)2/2.
Where above we use that
‖vi‖4 ≤ ‖v‖2
min(‖v‖1/32 , n1/20i )
=
‖v‖2
n
1/20
i
.
Thus, with the desired probability ‖vi+1‖4 ≤ ‖v‖2/n1/20i . This completes the inductive
step, and finishes the proof.
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4.2.4 Combined analysis
We are now ready to prove Lemma 23.
Proof of Lemma 23. First note that if i = t− 1, the lemma follows immediately from the
pseudorandomness properties of Z. We thus consider only i < t− 1.
We note that v · Yi = vi · Xi and v · Yi+1 = vi · Xi+1A(hi)D(Zi). If ‖v‖30 ≤ ni+1, we
are done by Lemma 24. Otherwise, assume that ‖v‖30 > ni+1. By Lemma 28 we have that
except for an event of probability δ/(4n) we have that
‖vi‖2 ≤ log(n)‖v‖2 and ‖vi‖4 ≤ ‖v‖2n−1/20i .
By ignoring the possibility that these are violated, we introduce an error of at most δ/(2n),
thus it suffices to only consider the case where the choice of h1, Z1, . . . , hi−1, Zi−1 are such
that the above holds. We now need to bound
|E[φvi,α(Xi)]− E[φvi,α(Xi+1A(hi)D(Zi))]| .
Since Xi has the same distribution as Xi+1A(hi)D(Xi), we may apply Lemma 26 that for
p = Ω
(
C log(n/δ)
log(ni)
)
that the above is bounded by
O(p)2p
(
α4‖vi‖42
ni+1
+ α4‖vi‖44
)p/8
≤ O(p)2p
(
24i log12(1/δ)n
−1/2
i + log
12(1/δ)n
−1/5
i
)p/8
≤
(
log52(n/δ)n
−1/5
i
)p/8
≤ n−p/50i
≤ δ/(2n).
This completes the proof.
Proposition 22 now follows immediately after noting that
|E[φv,α(X)] − E[φv,α(Y )]| ≤
t−1∑
i=1
|E[φv,α(Yi)]− E[φv,α(Yi+1)]| .
4.2.5 Approximating a product of cosines
Here we prove Lemma 27.
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Proof of Lemma 27. Note that so long as αSi < 1/10 for all i that by Taylor expansion we
have that
m∏
i=1
cos(2παSi)
= exp

−2π2α2 m∑
i=1
S2i +
p/2−1∑
j=2
(
cj
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
2j
)
+
m∑
i=1
O(αSi)
p


= exp(−2π2α2T ) exp

−2π2α2
(
m∑
i=1
S2i − T
)
+
p/2−1∑
j=2
(
cj
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
2j
)
+
m∑
i=1
O(αSi)
p


where the cj are constants obtained from the Taylor expansion of log(cos(z)). Furthermore,
since log(cos(z)) is analytic in a disk around z = 0, we have that cj = O(1)
j . Note by
conditioning on whether or not
∑m
i=1O(αSi)
p is more than 1, we find that the above is
equal to
exp(−2π2α2T ) exp

−2π2α2
(
m∑
i=1
S2i − T
)
+
p/2−1∑
j=2
(
cj
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
2j
)(1 + m∑
i=1
O(αSi)
p
)
+
m∑
i=1
O(αSi)
p.
For each j, let pj be the ceiling of p/(2j). Note that p ≤ 2j · pj ≤ 2p. Under the additional
assumption that α2
(∑m
i=1 S
2
i − T
)
,
∑m
i=1(αSi)
4 < a, for some sufficiently small constant
a we have that the above is equal to
exp(−2π2α2T ) ·
(
p2−1∑
t=0
(−2π2α2 (∑mi=1 S2i − T ))t
t!
)
·
(
1 +O
(
α2
(
m∑
i=1
S2i − T
))p2)
·
p/2−1∏
j=2

pj−1∑
t=0
(
cj
∑m
i=1(αSi)
2j
)t
t!

 ·
(
1 +O(1)p
(
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
2j
)pj)
·
(
1 +
m∑
i=1
O(αSi)
p
)
+
m∑
i=1
O(αSi)
p
= exp(−2π2α2T ) ·
(
p2−1∑
t=0
(−2π2α2 (∑mi=1 S2i − T ))t
t!
)
·
p/2−1∏
j=2

pj−1∑
t=0
(
cj
∑m
i=1(αSi)
2j
)t
t!


+O(1)p


(
α2
(
m∑
i=1
S2i − T
))p2
+
(
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
4
)p/4
+
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
p


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Next consider the above term
p/2−1∏
j=2

pj−1∑
t=0
(
cj
∑m
i=1(αSi)
2j
)t
t!

 .
Let it equal P (Si) + E(Si) where P is the polynomial consisting of all the terms of total
degree at most p. We note that for any j that cj
∑m
i=1(αSi)
2j is at most
O(a)j/4
(
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
4
)j/4
.
Therefore, |E(Si)| is at most
(∑m
i=1(αSi)
4
)p/8
times the sum of the degree more than p
coefficients in the Taylor expansion of
exp
(
1
1−O(a1/8z)
)
.
For a sufficiently small, the above has radius of convergence more than 1, and thus the
sum of the degree more than p terms is bounded. Thus, E(Si) is
O
(
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
4
)p/8
.
Therefore, assuming that αSi < 1/10 for all i, and α
2
(∑m
i=1 S
2
i − T
)
,
∑m
i=1(αSi)
4 < a,
then
m∏
i=1
cos(2παSi)
equals
exp(−2π2α2T ) ·
(
p2−1∑
t=0
(−2π2α2 (∑mi=1 S2i − T ))t
t!
)
P (Si)
+O(1)p

(α2
(
m∑
i=1
S2i − T
))p2
+
(
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
4
)p/8−1
+
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
p

 .
On the other hand, if the stated assumptions fail, the main term above is bounded by a
polynomial in α2
(∑m
i=1 S
2
i − T
)
and
∑m
i=1(αSi)
4 with total degree at most 2p and sum of
coefficients O(1)p. Therefore, under no additional assumptions we have that
m∏
i=1
cos(2παSi)
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equals
exp(−2π2α2T ) ·
(
p2−1∑
t=0
(−2π2α2 (∑mi=1 S2i − T ))t
t!
)
P (Si)
+O(1)p


(
α2
(
m∑
i=1
S2i − T
))p/2
+
(
α2
(
m∑
i=1
S2i − T
))p
+
(
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
4
)p/8
+
(
m∑
i=1
(αSi)
4
)p/2 .
The claim now follows.
4.3 Final analysis
We can finally state our main generator and prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let Y1, Y2 be the generators from Propositions 19 and 22 for δ = ǫ/6n.
Let Y be the the coordinate-wise product of the strings Y1, Y2. We claim that for any
v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n and X ∈u {±1}n,
dTV (v ·X, v · Y ) ≤ ǫ. (19)
The theorem follows immediately from the above claim and the bounds on the seed-lengths
from Propositions 19 and 22.
To prove the theorem, we first prove that for all α ∈ R,
|E[φv,α(X)] − E[φv,α(Y )]| ≤ ǫ/(2n).
Now, if log3(1/δ)/ ‖v‖2 ≤ α, then
E[φv,α(Y )] = E[φD(Y2)v,α(Y1)]
and
E[φv,α(X)] = E[φv,α(D(Y2)X)] = E[φD(Y2)v,α(X)].
However by Proposition 19, we have that∣∣E[φD(Y2)v,α(Y1)]− E[φD(Y2)v,α(X)]∣∣ ≤ ǫ/(3n).
Similarly, if α ≤ log3(1/δ)/ ‖v‖2, then then note that
E[φv,α(Y )] = E[φD(Y1)v,α(Y2)]
and
E[φv,α(X)] = E[φv,α(D(Y1)X)] = E[φD(Y1)v,α(X)].
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However by Proposition 22, we have that∣∣E[φD(Y1)v,α(Y2)]− E[φD(Y1)v,α(X)]∣∣ ≤ ǫ/(3n).
Thus, we have our result for all α ∈ [0, 1/4]. Noting that φv,−α(X) = φv,α(X), we determine
that the statement in question holds for α if and only if it holds for −α. Thus, the
inequality in question holds for all α ∈ [−1/4, 1/4]. Next, note that for any X ∈ {±1}n that
φv,α+1/2(X) = exp(πiv · X)φv,α(X) = (−1)‖v‖0φv,α(X). Thus, the statement in question
holds for α if and only if it holds for α + 1/2. Thus, it holds for all real α. Equation 19
now follows from the above argument and Claim 2 applied to Z1 = 〈v,X〉 and Z2 = 〈v, Y 〉.
References
[BO10] Eric Blais and Ryan O’Donnell. Lower bounds for testing function isomorphism.
In Computational Complexity (CCC), 2010 IEEE 25th Annual Conference on,
pages 235–246. IEEE, 2010.
[BRRY14] Mark Braverman, Anup Rao, Ran Raz, and Amir Yehudayoff. Pseudorandom
generators for regular branching programs. SIAM J. Comput., 43(3):973–986,
2014.
[BV10] Joshua Brody and Elad Verbin. The coin problem and pseudorandomness
for branching programs. In 51th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science, FOCS 2010, October 23-26, 2010, Las Vegas, Nevada,
USA, pages 30–39, 2010.
[CRSW13] L. Elisa Celis, Omer Reingold, Gil Segev, and Udi Wieder. Balls and bins:
Smaller hash families and faster evaluation. SIAM J. Comput., 42(3):1030–
1050, 2013.
[De11] Anindya De. Pseudorandomness for permutation and regular branching pro-
grams. In Proceedings of the 26th Annual IEEE Conference on Computational
Complexity, CCC 2011, San Jose, California, June 8-10, 2011, pages 221–231,
2011.
[De14] Anindya De. Beyond the central limit theorem: asymptotic expansions and
pseudorandomness for combinatorial sums, 2014. ECCC, TR14-125.
[DGJ+09] Ilias Diakonikolas, Parikshit Gopalan, Ragesh Jaiswal, Rocco A. Servedio, and
Emanuele Viola. Bounded independence fools halfspaces. In Proceedings of the
50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS
’09), 2009.
34
[DKN10] Ilias Diakonikolas, Daniel Kane, and Jelani Nelson. Bounded independence
fools degree-2 threshold functions. In Proceedings of the 51st Annual IEEE
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS ’10), 2010.
[Fel71] William Feller. An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications,
Vol. 2 (Volume 2). Wiley, New York, London, Sydney, 2nd edition, 1971.
[GMR+12] Parikshit Gopalan, Raghu Meka, Omer Reingold, Luca Trevisan, and Salil P.
Vadhan. Better pseudorandom generators from milder pseudorandom restric-
tions. In 53rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science,
FOCS 2012, New Brunswick, NJ, USA, October 20-23, 2012, pages 120–129,
2012.
[GMRZ13] Parikshit Gopalan, Raghu Meka, Omer Reingold, and David Zuckerman. Pseu-
dorandom generators for combinatorial shapes. SIAM J. Comput., 42(3):1051–
1076, 2013.
[GNR14] Parikshit Gopalan, Noam Nisan, and Tim Roughgarden, 2014. Manuscript in
preparation.
[GOWZ10] Parikshit Gopalan, Ryan O’Donnell, Yi Wu, and David Zuckerman. Fooling
functions of halfspaces under product distributions. In 25th Annual IEEE
Conference on Computational Complexity, pages 223–234, 2010.
[GR09] Parikshit Gopalan and Jaikumar Radhakrishnan. Finding duplicates in a data
stream. In Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on
Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2009, New York, NY, USA, January 4-6, 2009,
pages 402–411, 2009.
[HKM12] Prahladh Harsha, Adam Klivans, and Raghu Meka. An invariance principle
for polytopes. J. ACM, 59(6):29, 2012.
[INW94] Russell Impagliazzo, Noam Nisan, and Avi Wigderson. Pseudorandomness for
network algorithms. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM Sympo-
sium on Theory of Computing, 23-25 May 1994, Montre´al, Que´bec, Canada,
pages 356–364, 1994.
[IW97] Russell Impagliazzo and Avi Wigderson. P = BPP if E requires exponential
circuits: Derandomizing the XOR lemma. In STOC, pages 220–229, 1997.
[Kan11a] Daniel M. Kane. k-independent gaussians fool polynomial threshold functions.
In Proceedings of the 26th Annual IEEE Conference on Computational Com-
plexity, CCC 2011, San Jose, California, June 8-10, 2011, pages 252–261,
2011.
35
[Kan11b] Daniel M. Kane. A small PRG for polynomial threshold functions of gaussians.
In IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS
2011, Palm Springs, CA, USA, October 22-25, 2011, pages 257–266, 2011.
[Kan14] Daniel M. Kane. A pseudorandom generator for polynomial threshold functions
of gaussian with subpolynomial seed length. In IEEE 29th Conference on
Computational Complexity, CCC 2014, Vancouver, BC, Canada, June 11-13,
2014, pages 217–228, 2014.
[KM14] Pravesh Kothari and Raghu Meka. Almost-optimal pseudorandom generators
for spherical caps, 2014. Manuscript.
[KMN11] Daniel M. Kane, Raghu Meka, and Jelani Nelson. Almost optimal explicit
johnson-lindenstrauss families. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combi-
natorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques - 14th International Work-
shop, APPROX 2011, and 15th International Workshop, RANDOM 2011,
Princeton, NJ, USA, August 17-19, 2011. Proceedings, pages 628–639, 2011.
[KNP11] Michal Koucky´, Prajakta Nimbhorkar, and Pavel Pudla´k. Pseudorandom gen-
erators for group products: extended abstract. In Proceedings of the 43rd ACM
Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2011, San Jose, CA, USA, 6-8
June 2011, pages 263–272, 2011.
[KRS12] Zohar Shay Karnin, Yuval Rabani, and Amir Shpilka. Explicit dimension re-
duction and its applications. SIAM J. Comput., 41(1):219–249, 2012.
[LRTV09] Shachar Lovett, Omer Reingold, Luca Trevisan, and Salil P. Vadhan. Pseu-
dorandom bit generators that fool modular sums. In Approximation, Ran-
domization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques, 12th
International Workshop, APPROX 2009, and 13th International Workshop,
RANDOM 2009, Berkeley, CA, USA, August 21-23, 2009. Proceedings, pages
615–630, 2009.
[MOO05] Elchanan Mossel, Ryan O’Donnell, and Krzysztof Oleszkiewicz. Noise stability
of functions with low influences: invariance and optimality. In Proceedings of
the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS
’05), pages 21–30, 2005.
[MORS09] Kevin Matulef, Ryan O’Donnell, Ronitt Rubinfeld, and Rocco A. Servedio.
Testing ±1-weight halfspace. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combina-
torial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques, 12th International Workshop,
APPROX 2009, and 13th International Workshop, RANDOM 2009, Berkeley,
CA, USA, August 21-23, 2009. Proceedings, pages 646–657, 2009.
36
[MZ09] Raghu Meka and David Zuckerman. Small-bias spaces for group products. In
Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms
and Techniques, 12th International Workshop, APPROX 2009, and 13th Inter-
national Workshop, RANDOM 2009, Berkeley, CA, USA, August 21-23, 2009.
Proceedings, pages 658–672, 2009.
[MZ13] Raghu Meka and David Zuckerman. Pseudorandom generators for polynomial
threshold functions. SIAM J. Comput., 42(3):1275–1301, 2013.
[Nis92] Noam Nisan. Pseudorandom generators for space-bounded computation. Com-
binatorica, 12(4):449–461, 1992.
[Nis94] Noam Nisan. RL ⊆ SC. Computational Complexity, 4(1):1–11, 1994.
[NN93] Joseph Naor and Moni Naor. Small-bias probability spaces: Efficient construc-
tions and applications. SIAM J. on Comput., 22(4):838–856, 1993.
[NZ96] Noam Nisan and David Zuckerman. Randomness is linear in space. J. Comput.
System Sci., 52(1):43–52, 1996.
[O’D14] Ryan O’Donnell. Analysis of Boolean functions. Cambridge University Press,
2014.
[Rei08] Omer Reingold. Undirected connectivity in log-space. J. ACM, 55(4), 2008.
[RR99] Ran Raz and Omer Reingold. On recycling the randomness of states in space
bounded computation. In Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual ACM Sympo-
sium on Theory of Computing, May 1-4, 1999, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, pages
159–168, 1999.
[RS10] Yuval Rabani and Amir Shpilka. Explicit construction of a small epsilon-net
for linear threshold functions. SIAM J. Comput., 39(8):3501–3520, 2010.
[RS13] D. Ron and R. Servedio. Exponentially improved algorithms and lower bounds
for testing signed majorities. In ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algo-
rithms (SODA), pages 1319–1336, 2013.
[RTV06] Omer Reingold, Luca Trevisan, and Salil P. Vadhan. Pseudorandom walks on
regular digraphs and the RL vs. L problem. In Proceedings of the 38th Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Seattle, WA, USA, May 21-23,
2006, pages 457–466, 2006.
[SSS95] Jeanette P. Schmidt, Alan Siegel, and Aravind Srinivasan. Chernoff-hoeffding
bounds for applications with limited independence. SIAM J. Discrete Math.,
8(2):223–250, 1995.
37
[SZ99] Michael E. Saks and Shiyu Zhou. BP hspace(s) subseteq dspace(s
3/2). J.
Comput. Syst. Sci., 58(2):376–403, 1999.
[VW08] Emanuele Viola and Avi Wigderson. Norms, xor lemmas, and lower bounds
for polynomials and protocols. Theory of Computing, 4(7):137–168, 2008.
A Proofs from Section 2
Proof of Lemma 7. This follows from the fact that ‖Qp‖1 ≤ ‖Q‖p1. Therefore,
E [Q(x)p] ≤ E
X∈u{±1}n
[Q(X)p] + ‖Q‖p1δ ≤ (p − 1)pd/2 · ‖Q‖p2 + ‖Q‖p1δ.
Proof of Lemma 8. Note that because ‖v‖2 = 1 that ‖v‖1 ≤ ‖v‖1/20 by Cauchy-Schwarz.
We note by the Markov inequality that for even p that
Pr[|〈v, x〉| > t] ≤ t−p E[|〈v, x〉|p].
We need a slightly strengthened version of Lemma 7 to bound this. Note that if f(x) =
〈v, x〉
E[f(x)] ≤ ‖fp‖0ǫ+ ‖f‖pp ≤ ‖v‖p0ǫ+ (p − 1)(p − 3) · · · 1.
The bound on ‖f‖p comes from noting that the expectation of fp under Gaussian inputs is
(p− 1)(p − 3) · · · 1 and that the expectation under Bernoulli inputs is at most this (which
can be seen by expanding and comparing terms). Therefore, we have that
Pr[|〈v, x〉| > t] ≤ t−p
√
2(p/e)p/2 + t−p‖v‖p0ǫ
Letting p be the largest even integer less than t2, we find that this is at most
√
2 exp(−p/2) + ‖v‖t20 ǫ,
which is sufficient when t ≥ 2. For 1 ≤ t ≤ √2, the trivial upper bound of 1 is sufficient,
and for
√
2 ≤ t ≤ 2, we may instead use the bound for p = 2.
Proof of Lemma 9. Let Ii,k be the indicator function of the event that h(i) = k. Note that
h(v) =
∑
i,j,k Ii,kIj,kv
2
i v
2
j . Therefore,
h(v)p =
∑
i1,...,ip,j1,...,jp
∑
k1,...,kp
p∏
t=1
Iit,ktIjt,kt
p∏
t=1
v2itv
2
jt.
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Let R(it, jt, kt) be 0 if for some t, t
′ kt 6= k′t but one of it or jt equals it′ or jt′ and otherwise
be equal to m−T where T is the number of distinct values taken by it or jt. Notice that
by the δ-biasedness of h that
E
[
p∏
t=1
Iit,ktIjt,kt
]
≤ R(it, jt, kt) + δ.
Combining with the above we find that
E[h(v)p] ≤
∑
i1,...,ip,j1,...,jp
∑
k1,...,kp
(R(it, jt, kt) + δ)
p∏
t=1
v2itv
2
jt
≤
∑
i1,...,ip,j1,...,jp
∑
k1,...,kp
R(it, jt, kt)
p∏
t=1
v2itv
2
jt + δm
p
∑
i1,...,ip,j1,...,jp
p∏
t=1
v2itv
2
jt
≤
∑
i1,...,ip,j1,...,jp
∑
k1,...,kp
R(it, jt, kt)
p∏
t=1
v2itv
2
jt + δm
p‖v‖4p2 .
Next we consider ∑
k1,...,kp
R(it, jt, kt)
for fixed values of i1, . . . , ip, j1, . . . , jp. We claim that it is at most m
−S/2 where S is
again the number of distinct elements of the form it or jt that appear in this way an odd
number of times. Letting T be the number of distinct elements of the form it or jt, the
expression in question is m−T times the number of choices of kt so that each value of it
or jt appears with only one value of kt. In other words this is m
−T times the number of
functions f : {it, jt} → [m] so that f(it) = f(jt) for all t. This last relation splits {it, jt}
into equivalence classes given by the transitive closure of the operation that x ∼ y if x = it
and y = jt for some t. We note that any x that appears an odd number of times as an
it or jt must be in an equivalence class of size at least 2 because it must appear at least
once with some other element. Therefore, the number of equivalence classes, E is at least
T −S/2. Thus, the sum in question is at most m−TmE ≤ m−S/2. Therefore, we have that
E[h(v)p] ≤ (2p)!
∑
Multisets M⊂[n],|M |=2p
m−{Odd(M)}/2
∏
i∈M
v2i + δm
p‖v‖4p2 .
Where Odd(M) is the number of elements occurring in M an odd number of times. This
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equals
E[h(v)p] ≤ (2p)!
p∑
k=0
∑
Multisets M⊂[n],|M |=2p,Odd(M)=2k
m−k
∏
i∈M
v2i + δm
p‖v‖4p2
≤ (2p)!
p∑
k=0
m−k
∑
i1,...,i2k
∑
j1,...,jp−k
∏
v2it
∏
v4jt + δm
p‖v‖4p2
= (2p)!
p∑
k=0
(‖v‖42
m
)k
‖v‖4(p−k)4 + δmp‖v‖4p2
≤ O(p)2p
(‖v‖42
m
)p
+O(p)2p‖v‖4p4 + δmp‖v‖4p2 .
Note that the second line above comes from taking M to be the multiset
{i1, i2, . . . , i2k, j1, j1, j2, j2, . . . , jp−k, jp−k}.
This completes our proof.
Proof of Lemma 10. Let Xi denote the indicator random variable which is 1 if h(i) = j
and 0 otherwise. Let Z =
∑
i viXi. Now, if h were a truly random hash function, then, by
Hoeffding’s inequality,
Pr [|Z − ‖v‖1 /m| ≥ t] ≤ 2 exp
(
−t2/2
∑
i
v2i
)
.
Therefore, for a truly random hash function and even integer p ≥ 2, ‖Z‖p = O(‖v‖2)
√
p.
Therefore, for a δ-biased hash family, we get ‖Z‖pp ≤ O(p)p/2 ‖v‖p2 + ‖v‖p1 δ. Hence, by
Markov’s inequality, for any t > 0,
Pr [|Z − ‖v‖1 /m| ≥ t] ≤
O(p)p/2 ‖v‖p2 + ‖v‖p1 δ
tp
.
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